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Capitalism: Ruling class want responsible encryption
  • Vitaliy_KiselevVitaliy_Kiselev

    Billions of instant messages are sent and received each day using mainstream apps employing default end-to-end encryption. The app creators do something that the law does not allow telephone carriers to do: they exempt themselves from complying with court orders.

    Responsible encryption is achievable. Responsible encryption can involve effective, secure encryption that allows access only with judicial authorization. Such encryption already exists. Examples include the central management of security keys and operating system updates; the scanning of content, like your e-mails, for advertising purposes; the simulcast of messages to multiple destinations at once; and key recovery when a user forgets the password to decrypt a laptop.

    No one calls any of those functions a “back door.” In fact, those capabilities are marketed and sought out by many users.

    The proposal that providers retain the capability to make sure evidence of crime can be accessed when appropriate is not an unprecedented idea.

    Such a proposal would not require every company to implement the same type of solution. The government need not require the use of a particular chip or algorithm, or require any particular key management technique or escrow. The law need not mandate any particular means in order to achieve the crucial end: when a court issues a search warrant or wiretap order to collect evidence of crime, the provider should be able to help.

    No law can guarantee that every single product that offers encryption will also come with an adequate capability to prevent that product from being used to hide evidence of crime.

    A requirement to implement a solution could be applied thoughtfully, in the places where it is needed most. Encrypted communications and devices pose the greatest threat to public safety when they are part of mass-market consumer devices and services that enable warrant-proof encryption by default.

    This measures are not about terrorist or threats.

    This measures is to prevent working people to rise and communication is required for this, as ruling class is afraid of this all (in India they shut down cellular networks in regions for same purpose :-) ).

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  • kankalakankala

    They are asking for backdoors in crypto. This is not the first war against secure, no backdoor cryptology. They now use terrorism as a pretense for it.

    The problem always remains, if the government can use the backdoor, not long after, the criminals will use those backdoors.

    In the mean time US senate has approved Signal for staff use. Signal is a secure messaging app with no backdoor, and no large corporate owner who can be pressured to install a backdoor. Also open source. https://www.engadget.com/2017/05/17/us-senate-approves-signal-for-staff-use/

  • Vitaliy_KiselevVitaliy_Kiselev

    In the mean time US senate has approved Signal for staff use. Signal is a secure messaging app with no backdoor, and no large corporate owner who can be pressured to install a backdoor.

    The encryption of Signal (=WhatsApp, FB) was funded by the US Government.

    Signal was created by the same spooky regime change outfits that fund the Tor Project. The money primarily comes through the federal government’s premier Internet Freedom venture capital outfit: Open Technology Fund, which works closely with the State Department’s regime change arm and is funded through several layers of Cold War CIA cutouts — including Radio Free Asia and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

    The encrypted chat app — which can be downloaded from Apple and Google’s stores for free — is built by Open Whisper Systems (aka Quiet Riddle Ventures), an opaque for-profit organization run by Moxie Marlinspike (not his real name). Marlinspike likes to keep the details of his biography wrapped in mystery. He poses as an anti-government radical in the mold of Jacob Appelbaum, who selflessly works for the greater good, risking life and freedom building super-secure communication technology powerful enough to stand to the National Security Agency. It’s a nice story. The reality is something different: Marlinspike made a bunch of money selling his previous encryption startup to Twitter in 2011. Right after that, he began partnering with America’s soft-power regime change apparatus — including the State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors — which led to them funding his next venture: a suite of encrypted chat and voice mobile apps. Signal is a direct result of this project.

    You won’t find it anywhere on Open Whisper System’s website, but Signal depends on NatSec cash for continued survival. Exactly how much cash is hard to gauge, as Open Whisper System refuses to disclose its financing structure. But if you tally up documents released by Radio Free Asia’s Open Technology Fund, we know Marlinspike’s outfit received $2.26 million in the span of the past three years — not exactly pocket change. And the NatSec cashflow shows no sign of ending.

    Signal, like Tor, is bankrolled by the soft-power wing of the U.S. National Security State as part of a larger “Internet Freedom” initiative — an attempt to leverage the Internet and digital communication tools as a compliment to more traditional elements of psychological warfare and regime change ops. The ideas behind “Internet Freedom” go back to the origins of the commercial Internet, but they began to be implemented in earnest during President Barack Obama’s first term — led by Hillary Clinton’s State Department.

    In your place I'll keep away form Signal, go around it very far.

    The problem always remains, if the government can use the backdoor, not long after, the criminals will use those backdoors.

    You also do not understand some basics. It is government who is management of ruling class who have sole interest in it, and it is them who are your main enemy. Criminals is just added bonus.

  • kankalakankala

    Upsy.

    But you should know I did not have any illusions about the benevolence of the government intentions. I know "1984" first hand. I just didn't want to state it so openly, so I chose the "criminals can use it too" variant.

    Signal is still open source, so at least theoretically, it could be reviewed for those NSA backdoors. Of course the servers are not review-able, so even if the cryptology does not have backdoors, and the content really is secure, the metadata (your web of connections, who did you communicate with, and when) is on the server. And metadata = surveillance.

    Can you recommend a communication app that is not secretly maintained by NSA, FSB(no offense), Chinese or other state actor?

  • Vitaliy_KiselevVitaliy_Kiselev

    Signal is still open source, so at least theoretically, it could be reviewed for those NSA backdoors. Of course the servers are not review-able, so even if the cryptology does not have backdoors, and the content really is secure, the metadata (your web of connections, who did you communicate with, and when) is on the server. And metadata = surveillance.

    Open source means nothing, actually.

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